Underground gambling market and its volume (Cuba)

With a complete ban on commercial gambling, any "casino activity" in Cuba exists outside the law. This means: there are no official statistics on market volume, and any estimates are work with indirect indicators. Below is a sober analysis of how the underground gambling turnover can be assessed in general, what it consists of, what limitations the methods have, and what scenario conclusions can be reached without romanticization and without instructions.

1) Why the numbers are slipping: Measurement limitations

Lack of reporting: no taxes, licenses, financial declarations.

Fragmentation: the market is a lot of foci (home tables, "sore," closed clubs, offshore sites/bots), between which there is no single accounting.

Self-censorship of participants: organizers and players hide activity due to legal risks.

Displaced sources: news about raids and criminal cases reflect the work of law enforcement officers, and not the real market share.

The "wave" effect: suppression leads to a short-term drop in activity and its migration (in time and space).

2) Indirect evaluation methods (what can be considered at all)

1. Law enforcement cuts: the number of raids, seized equipment/cash, identified networks of couriers ("bankers" in pain). Risk: The numbers show control efforts, not the entire market.

2. Household surveys (anonymous): Proportion of those betting in the past 12 months, average check, frequency. Risk: socially desired responses, fear of recognition.

3. Behavioral indicators: bursts of interest in games/bets in search and social networks, conversational patterns (indirectly). Risk: Confusion with "no money" entertainment content

4. Financial traces: anomalies of P2P transfers and crypto-exits on local wallets (aggregated). Risk: Data is rarely available and not accurately attributed to gambling.

5. Expert panels: opinions of social workers, hoteliers, taxi companies, artistic scenes about "night" patterns. Risk: subjectivity and local limitation.

💡 No single technique gives the "truth." A meaningful approach is the triangulation of several sources.

3) Underground food mix

Home games: card tables, dice; small revolutions, high frequency, "own" audiences.

Underground lotteries (bolita): bets "on numbers" through "bankers" and couriers; a large number of small checks.

Hidden machines/video tape: rare foci; turnover is volatile, depending on the "survivability" of the point.

Offshore online platforms: intermediary deposits/P2P/crypto, unstable withdrawal channels; high risk of non-payment.

Micro-betting "on the street": spontaneous "interest games," often turning into monetary disputes.

4) Demand and audiences

Ritual players are sore: low stakes "by dates/dreams," regularity.

Opportunists: episodic "try"; check is small, frequency is low.

Economically vulnerable: looking for "fast money," subject to debt spirals.

Digital experimenters: offshore slots/rates "through intermediaries," above checks, above loss.

Organizers and intermediaries: "bank" holders, collectors, recruiters - the core of cash flows.

5) Cash flows and margin

Cash remains the base: the speed of calculation, the absence of a "trace," but the risks of theft and confiscation.

P2P and "electronic debt": Vulnerable to non-payment and disputes.

Crypto Windows: Volatility, Commissions, Locks and Repeat KYC.

Organizers' margin: above "white" jurisdictions due to opacity of rules and "right to change terms"; players have a systemic disadvantage.

6) Geography and seasonality

Havana: the greatest concentration of hearths and "indoor" games; the tourist backdrop pushes offers, but for foreigners it's a danger zone.

Suburbs and areas with dense development: convenient for "home" formats and pain.

Resort areas: hotel "imitations without money" are legal; everything that goes beyond - a risk for both organizers and tourists.

Seasonality: holidays/peak tourist weeks ↔ bursts of activity; after raids - "subsidence" and migration of points.

7) The effect of restraint and the "toothed saw effect"

Raids break chains, increase underground transaction costs and reduce turnover for a short time.

Adaptation: transition to smaller groups, change of communication channels, departure to "micro-formats."

Bottom line: the market is "breathing" jerks; long-term prohibition and suppression keep the underground fragmented and relatively small compared to the pre-war "night economy."

8) Framework of scenario estimates (illustratively, without a claim to an "exact figure")

Scenario A - "Focal" (conservative): low population involvement, dominance of small checks, pain, rare machines; the offshore channel is limited. Volume: minimal relative to the tourist income of large neighboring jurisdictions.

Scenario B - "Mixed" (basic): stable pain + periodic "room" games + limited offshore. Volume: above A, but far from the level of the legal market of neighbors; a significant part of the turnover "burns out" on non-payments and fraud.

Scenario C - "Splash" (stress case): temporary growth of offshore/crypto channels and hidden machines, then a fall after raids and locks. Volume: abrupt, but unstable, with a high proportion of player losses.

💡 In all scenarios, real purchasing power and preventive risks are natural volume limiters.

9) The social price of each "underground peso"

Non-payment and debt → neighborhood-level conflict and violence.

Leakage of funds offshore → zero consumer protection.

Household financial vulnerability → savings on nutrition/health/education.

Stigma and legal consequences → barriers to employment and undermining trust in the community.

10) How to reduce harm (without changing the ban)

Financial literacy: Explain the maths "benefits of home" and the pitfalls of "small bets."

Social alternatives: tournament activities without money, cultural programs, sports.

Support for addicts: access to psychological assistance and mutual assistance groups.

Risk communication: cases of non-payment and "disappeared intermediaries" instead of myths about "quick wins."

11) Short FAQ

Is there an exact market volume figure? No, it isn't. Any numbers are scenario estimates with large errors.

Main turnover driver? Frequent small bet (sore) and periodic "indoor" games; offshore adds risk, but not stability.

Why is there "always a lack of data"? Because the underground is not interested in transparency, and suppression and prohibition make the market short-lived and fragmented.

Who loses more? Players from vulnerable groups and intermediaries of the "lower link" - with maximum risks and minimal "profitability."

Cuba's underground gambling market is not a single industry, but a set of short-lived hotbeds with small checks, high fragmentation and a systemic risk of non-payment. Its volume is difficult to measure and even more difficult to stabilize: prohibition and regular suppression keep activity on a low-average background relative to the "golden era" and legal markets of neighbors. The main consequence is social and financial harm, which many times exceeds the imaginary benefit of the participants.