Comparison with other countries (Macau, Singapore)

The three largest models of the gambling market in the world - the United States, Macau and Singapore - are similar only in appearance. In practice, they differ in scale, demand structure, share of non-game revenues and regulatory rigidity. Below is the current "photo" of the markets for 2024-2025 and key conclusions for business and travelers.

1) Scale of markets: "weights" and dynamics

USA. The commercial sector updated its record: $71.92 billion in revenue in 2024 (the fourth consecutive year of maximum). Approximately 30% falls on online verticals (sports + iGaming), the rest is offline casinos.

Macau. In 2024, gross gambling income (GGR) amounted to MOP 226.8 billion (~ $28.35 billion), which is higher than the forecasts of the authorities, but lower than 2019. In 2025, monthly fees are stable at the level of MOP 22.1 billion (~ $2.7 billion) in "strong" months.

Singapore. The duopoly of Marina Bay Sands and Resorts World Sentosa combines high gambling income with a powerful MICE component. MBS for the reporting 2024 - $1.27 billion in casino revenue with a significant share of non-gaming (numbers, F&B, retail). RWS's tourist flow and investment projects support growth.

2) Regulation: who and how governs

USA: federalism. Each jurisdiction itself sets taxes, game types, advertising and online rules; in parallel, tribal casinos exist. The industry is transparent in reporting and highly diversified (Vegas, Atlantic City, regional markets, online).

Macau: six concessions, hard reset of rules after 2022: VIP rooms at junkets are closed, junkets themselves are sharply limited (cap up to 50 licenses until 2026). Rate on mass-premium and non-game concession obligations.

Singapore: IR duopoly (MBS and RWS) with powerful social barriers: entry levy S $150/day or S $3,000/year is valid for citizens/permanent residence; strict RG circuit and attendance control.

3) Revenue structure: VIP vs mass and non-game

USA: base - slots and tables of the mass segment; supplement - sports book and online (in permitted states). On tourist clusters (Las Vegas), non-gaming revenues (hotels, gastronomy, shows, MICE) are comparable in importance to gaming revenues.

Macau: depended on VIPs until the 2020s; now the driver is premium mass, which improves margins and resistance to regulatory risks. Baccarat remains an anchor, but the market is expanding due to tourism and events.

Singapore: IR model is initially balanced: casino + MICE + luxury retail + restaurants + entertainment. This is a "resort" product with a high share of non-gaming.

4) Social and compliance tools

USA: responsible instruments and limits vary by state; strict AML/Title 31 for offline and online. Regulators publish reports, fines for advertising and RG violations.

Macau: strict supervision of promoters, reporting and requirements for non-player investment in concessions; focus on diversifying the economy and controlling VIP channels.

Singapore: entrance fee for residents is a powerful filter; operators have extensive RG programs and obligations to cooperate with regulators on social indicators (including monitoring resident visits).

5) Tourism and events

USA (Las Vegas): casino synergy with arenas and congresses; multi-day "event magnets" increase prices for rooms and turnover of casinos/sports books.

Macau: restoring inbound tourism, growing quarterly GGRs and moving to a more "family "/entertainment product in addition to the game.

Singapore: MICE center of the region; IR pulls "high quality" visits with a high share of spending on luxury segments.

6) Taxes and economy for the state

USA: the tax picture is mosaic, but in total the commercial sector gives record revenues to states and cities (through specific rates, sales/room tax, etc.).

Macau: gambling fees - the foundation of the budget (the game is the lion's share of tax revenues); the authorities set a course for non-game diversification.

Singapore: monetization through tax/licenses and IR multiplier (employment, MICE, high value tourism); social fees (levy) are directed to socially useful purposes.

7) Key differences - "in one table"

8) What it means for the player and for the business

Player/tourist

In the USA - the largest selection (prices/levels/shows), many non-game activities.

Macau has an "Asian Vegas," where rates are traditionally higher and casinos integrate with resorts and premium service.

Singapore has two flagship IRs with a strong "non-game" program; for residents, entrance to the casino is paid (levy).

To operators/investors

USA: growth due to omnichannel (onlayn↔oflayn), sports and MICE; competition is high.

Macau: premium mass rate, non-gaming concession obligations, tidy VIP risk management.

Singapore: IR investments are paid back through a "comprehensive" guest check (MICE/retail/F & B); the gambling hall is only part of the model.

The United States is the largest and most diversified market where online and offline "work in tandem." Macau follows the trajectory of premium mass with tighter control of the VIP channel. Singapore shows the strength of the IR model, where casinos are just one of the pillars next to MICE and luxury tourism; social restrictions (entry levy) are an integral part of the system. Looking at 2024-2025, all three jurisdictions demonstrate robust demand and revenue growth - but achieve this with different tools and with a different balance between the game and the "experience industry."