Why encryption of all user data is important

Player data is not only e-mail and password. These are KYC documents, payment tokens, betting logs, devices, IP, behavioral metrics. Any leak hits reputation, license and P & L. Full encryption (en route, in storage and partially "in use") minimizes the consequences of incidents: a stolen dump or intercepted traffic turns into a meaningless set of bytes without keys.

1) Threat model: what encryption protects us from

Traffic interception (MITM, insecure networks) → TLS 1. 2+/1. 3.

Theft of backups/disk snapshots → encryption on storage (disk/db/object).

Access errors/incorrect rights → field encryption, tokenization, masking.

Compromise of accounting/internal abuse → separation of keys and data, RBAC/ABAC.

Physical loss of media/devices of employees → FDE/MDM.

Important: Encryption complements, not replaces, access control, logging, and network segmentation.

2) Three layers of encryption (together, not separately)

1. In transit: HTTPS/TLS 1. 2+/1. 3, mTLS between services, HSTS, webhook signatures (HMAC) + anti-replay ('timestamp', nonce).

2. At rest:

Disks/volumes: LUKS/BitLocker/eCryptfs, auto-mount with KMS.
Databases/objects: AES-256-GCM, individual keys by data domains (PII, finance, logs).
Backups/snapshots: separate key policy, offsite/Geo, recovery check.
3. In use: field encryption of sensitive fields, masking in UI/logs, restriction of de-encryption on the application side; for particularly critical - TEE/confidential calculations.

3) Keys - more important than ciphers: KMS/HSM and operations

KMS/HSM: generation/storage of root keys, rotation, audit of operations.

Hierarchy: CMK (root) → DEK (data) → keys for different domains (wallet/KYC/logs).

Rotation: planned (90-180 days) and unscheduled (compromise), crypto-shred upon recall.

Separation of duties (SoD): DB admin does not have access to keys; the crypto officer does not see the data.

Time Demand Access (JIT) + MFA for admins.

4) What exactly to encrypt (and how deeply)

PII: full name, address, date of birth, contacts → field encryption in the database, masking in the logs.

KYC: documents, selfies, liveness → separate storage/keys, short retention.

Payments: never keep PAN; tokenization, PCI DSS scope reduction, PSP hosted pages.

Game magazines/honesty: sides/nonce, version control - read-only, signatures.

Telemetry and BI: anonymization/pseudonymization, differential privacy where appropriate.

5) Algorithms and default settings

Symmetrical: AES-256-GCM/ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD, integrity protection).

Key Exchange/Session: ECDHE with PFS.

Key cryptography: ECDSA P-256/P-384 or signature RSA-3072.

Password hash: Argon2id (or scrypt/bcrypt with correct parameters), not SHA-256.

TLS: 1. 3 on, 1. 2 as compatibility; ciphers only AEAD, disable CBC/RC4.

IV/nonce: unique, non-repeatable; store with the ciphertext.

6) Performance: how not to "drop" FPS and cashier

Use hardware instructions (AES-NI) and key pools.

Encrypt fields, not the entire string, where search/indexes are needed.

For static assets - TLS + CDN (edge cache), HTTP/2/3.

Do not encrypt hot data many times on each hop - build a crypto conveyor.

Profile: more often "slows down" not crypto, but I/O/serialization.

7) Logs, backups and test environments

Logs: mask tokens/PII, store in unchanging WORM storage, encrypt archives.

Backups: encryption with separate keys, periodic DR tests (restore rehearsal), retention by policy.

Dev/Stage: Never use real PII; synthetics/masking, individual keys and networks.

8) Privacy and compliance

GDPR/local analogues: legal processing bases, DSR (access/removal/correction), minimization.

PCI DSS: card tokenization, transport encryption, segregation of the payment loop.

Processor contracts: DPIA, SCC/DTIA in cross-border transmission.

Retention policies: "no need - delete," crypto-erase as part of offboarding.

9) Typical mistakes (and how to prevent them)

We encrypt the data, and the keys are in the code/repository. Keep keys in KMS/Vault, scan secrets.

Single key "for everything." Divide by domains and environments.

TLS is, but no HSTS/pinning/webhook signatures. Add HSTS preload, HMAC and anti-replay.

Logs with PII in clear text. Masking + separate key space for archives.

No key rotation and key audit. Configure the schedule, alerts, and activity log.

Tests with real documents. Synthetics/anonymization only.

10) "default encryption" implementation checklist

TLS 1. 2+/1. 3 everywhere (edge, inter-service), HSTS, 'wss ://'
KMS/HSM, key hierarchy, rotation and auditing
Database/Object/Backup Encryption + PII Field Encryption
Card tokenization, PCI scope reduction
Hash Argon2id passwords, salt per user
PII masking in logs, WORM storage, SIEM
Dev/Stage without real PII; individual keys/networks
Retention/crypto-shred policies, DSR processes (GDPR)
Webhook Signatures (HMAC), anti-replay, mTLS inside
DR recovery tests, offsite backups, leak monitoring

11) Mini-FAQ

Is on-disk encryption enough? No, it isn't. Need TLS + field encryption + key management.

Will encryption slow down the game? With the right architecture, no: bottlenecks are usually in the network/render.

Why tokenization if there is encryption? Tokens eliminate PAN storage and reduce the PCI perimeter.

Do I need to encrypt telemetry? Yes, minimum travel and archiving; plus anonymization.

What to do when the key is compromised? Immediate rotation/recall, crypto-shred, access analysis, IR policy notifications.

Encryption of all user data is a basic layer of security that only works in conjunction with proper key management, access segregation, data minimization, and DevSecOps discipline. Build a crypto architecture "by default," automate rotations and DR tests, encrypt backups and logs, mask PII - and even in the event of an incident, you will retain the trust of players, regulators and partners, limiting the consequences to manageable ones.