Why it is important to use original payment forms
The payment form is the point where the user enters the most sensitive data: card number, CVC, wallet logins. If the form is unoriginal (fake site, "self-written" card field at the merchant instead of the provider's hosted form, broken integration), you risk data leakage, bank failures, chargeback and locks. The original form is a page/widget of a payment provider (PSP/bank) that has passed security certification and is connected according to the correct scenario (iFrame/Hosted Fields/redirect).
What is the "original payment form"
Hosted by PSP: PAN/CVC/term fields - inside the provider's iFrame/Hosted Fields or on its domain (redirect).
Corresponds to PCI DSS: the merchant does not see and does not store "raw" card data, receives only a token.
Supports SCA/3-D Secure 2: confirmation of payment through the bank (push/SMS/biometrics).
Protected by protocols: strict TLS, HSTS, CSP, clickjacking protection.
Identifiable: correct domain/certificate and predictable UX with merchant details.
Why is it critical (for user and business)
For the user
Protection of card data: tokenization and isolation of card fields exclude "peeping" by merchant and scripts.
Less phishing and account theft: the recipient's name and 3-DS2 confirm the payment to your bank.
Higher chances of successful payment: correct integration = fewer technical failures.
For business
Compliance and lower penalties: PCI DSS compliance reduces audit liability and cost.
Less chargeback: 3-DS2 transfers responsibility to the issuer in a dispute.
More conversion: fast SCA, Apple/Google Pay, saved tokens for one-click.
Brand protection: no "formjacking" (embedding malicious scripts) and leaks.
What proper integration should look like
1. Redirect to the PSP or Hosted Fields/iFrame domain inside the merchant page.
2. Card fields (PAN/CVC/expiry) technically belong to the provider - the merchant receives a token.
3. SCA/3-DS 2 starts automatically: push to the bank application, biometrics, SMS code.
4. Page-level protections: HSTS, Content Security Policy (CSP), X-Frame-Options, nonce/script hashes.
5. Pure UX: single font/layout or proprietary PSP widget, correct descriptor of the merchant.
Why non-original forms are dangerous
Formjacking (Magecart): Malicious JS remove PAN/CVC on the fly.
Phishing/domain substitution: similar URLs, fake logos, "lock" in itself does not guarantee anything.
PCI non-compliance: fines, mandatory audits, acquiring blocking.
Waivers and withholdings: issuers cut gray integrations, more Do not honor.
KYC leaks: requesting a "photo card on both sides" and a passport by e-mail is a gross violation.
Features of the original form (for the user)
The map fields are located in the built-in iFrame (cursor and frame "inside" a small window) or you get to the domain of a well-known PSP/bank.
Address bar: HTTPS, valid certificate, correct domain without typos.
3-D Secure/SCA appears automatically (push/SMS/biometrics from your bank).
No requests to send PAN/CVC/photo cards to chat/mail.
Privacy policy and payment terms are open and readable.
Red flags (stop right away)
Map fields directly on the merchant site without iFrame/Hosted Fields.
Ask for PAN/CVC by e-mail/messenger or "photo card on both sides."
The domain is strange: 'pay-secure. shop-brand-verify. net 'instead of brand/PSP domain.
The page pulls non-secret resources (http) at the payment step or "swears" at the certificate.
Broken localization, pixel logos, spelling errors, "pay for 2:59" timers.
Checklist for user (1 minute)
- Payment goes through redirect to PSP or iFrame/Hosted Fields.
- HTTPS/certificate valid, domain no substitutions.
- SCA/3-DS2 worked (push/SMS/biometrics).
- I do not send PAN/CVC/photo cards to chat/mail.
- Keep your privacy policy and contacts in place.
Business Checklist (Integration/Security)
- Using Hosted Fields/iFrame or PSP redirect; merchant does not see PAN/CVC.
- PCI DSS: SAQ A/SAQ A-EP by integration type, tokenization, network segmentation.
- CSP/HSTS/XFO enabled; external scripts - by allow-list with hashes/nonce.
- 3-DS 2/SCA on; fallback на OTP/push; Wallets support (Apple/Google Pay).
- Monitoring front changes (SRI, canary scripts), protection against formjacking.
- Clear texts: who is the acquirer/PSP, how the data is processed, return dates.
- Regular penetration tests and dependency control (SCA - Software Composition Analysis).
Common problems and how to solve them quickly
FAQ (short)
Address bar lock = secure?
No, it isn't. This is just encryption. Look at domain, hosted form, 3-DS2, and policy.
Why is iFrame better than the fields on the site?
Because PAN/CVC go directly to the PSP and do not touch the merchant front - there are fewer risks and PCI requirements.
Can I take card details by phone/chat?
No, it isn't. This is a gross PCI violation. Use the payment link/invoice with the hosted form.
If the form "hangs" without SCA?
Reboot, check the network/browser. Make sure not to block PSP popups/scripts.
Mini-policy for the company (ready-made framework)
1. Hosted Fields only/redirect for PAN/CVC.
2. 3-DS 2/SCA is mandatory for cards; connected by Apple/Google Pay.
3. CSP/HSTS/XFO/SRI + strict allow-list domains.
4. Monitoring the front and alerts for script substitution.
5. SAQ/PCI audit annually; pentests on schedule.
6. Support never asks for a PAN/CVC/photo card; only protected KYC channels.
The original payment form is not aesthetics, but security and legality. Hosted fields, tokenization and SCA protect the cardholder, increase conversion and remove a significant part of the risk from the business. User - check domain, form and SCA; business - use only certified integrations with hard front defenses. Following these rules, you close 90% of data leakage and payment failure scenarios.